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The Privilege Against Self- Incrimination
and Required Income Tax Records
By BERNARD D. MELTZER
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School
This is an excerpt from "Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," which appeared in the University of Chicago
Law Review (Volume 18, Number 4). The original article dealt with the debate
regarding the wisdom of the privilege, the operation of. the privilege in various
kinds of legal proceedings and the withdrawal of the privilege from records
required by law and from the records of corporations and of certain unincorporated associations. This excerpt dealing with the questions raised by revenue
:records is presented with the permission of the University of Chicago Press.

The cases with the sharpest impact on
this question are not tax cases but cases
involving government regulation. Probably
the most important of these cases is Shapiro
*v. U. S.,2 involving the effect of OPA recordkeeping requirements on the privileged status

of required records. Shapiro, a licensee
under OPA food regulations, had been suspected of having made tie-in sales in violation of those regulations. He was served
with a subpoena directing him to produce
certain records which OPA regulations required him to keep. At Shapiro's appearance
with those records before an OPA hearing
officer, his lawyer asked whether Shapiro
was being granted immunity "as to any and
all matters for information obtained as a
result of the investigation and examination
of these records." ' The hearing officer, more
circumspect than illuminating, replied that
"the witness is entitled to whatever immunity flows as a matter of law from the
production of those books and records which
are required to be kept pursuant to M. P. R.'s
271 and 426."' Shapiro, after claiming his

I For a review of authorities with respect
-to corporate documents, see Oklahoma Press
Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186,
204-209 (1946); Meltzer, "Required Records,
-the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
,Self-Incrimination,"
18 The University of
..Chicago Law Review 687, at pp. 701-704; with
respect to documents of unincorporated associations, see U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694
(1944); Meltzer, article cited above, at pp.

704-706, which discusses the possibility that
the privilege will be maintained as to the
books of "smaller" associations.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on U. S. v. White, held
the documents of a trust unprivileged. See
U. S. v. Field, et al., decided October 30, 1951.
2 335 U. S. 1 (1948).
8 335 U. S., atp. 4.
4 335 U. S., at p. 4.
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and
of
unincorporated
are not
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.' The doctrines employed to reach this
result operate regardless of whether there
is a legal requirement that such records be
-kept. Accordingly, it is only where the taxpayer is an individual or perhaps a small
unincorporated association that the applicability of the privilege to taxpayers' records
-required by law raises a substantial question.
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"constitutional privilege" and his statutory
immunity, produced the subpoenaed records.
In his trial for having made illegal tie-in
sales, his plea in bar based on a claim that
the immunity provisions of the Emergency
Price Control Act' insulated him against
prosecution was overruled. His conviction
followed and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,' and then
by a sharply divided Supreme Court.
The majority interpreted the statute as
conferring immunity only when a witness
is required to present evidence covered by
the privilege against self-incrimination. It
supported its conclusion that the records
produced by Shapiro were not privileged by
invoking the principle announced by Mr.
Justice Hughes in the Wilson case' and
reaffirmed in the Davis case:'
. . . the privilege which exists as to
private papers cannot be maintained in relation to 'records required by law to be kept
in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which a'e the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation, and
the enforcement of restrictions validly established'."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a strong dissent," argued that the Court had needlessly
reached a grave constitutional question by
adopting a "sophisticated" construction of
the immunity provision which, read literally,
conferred immunity. On the constitutional
question, which is our primary concern, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, although conceding the
validity of the record-keeping requirements,
denied that the mere requirement that records be kept rendered the required records
unprivileged."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter challenged the
majority's reliance on the Wilson dictum,
urging that Mr. Justice Hughes had him'56 Stat. 23 (1942). as amended, 50 USCA
App. See. 922 (g) (1944).
6 U. S. v. Shapiro, 159 F. (2d) 890 (CCA-2,
1947).
7 Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S.361, 381-382 (1911).
' Davis v. U. S., 328 U. S. 582, 589-590 (1946).
9335 U. S.,at p. 33. A similar dictum laid
down in Boyd v. U. S.,116 U. S. 616, 623-624
(1886), was quoted in the Shapiro case (335
U. S., at p. 33, footnote 42). While the majority opinion pointed to this dictum, Frankfurter, J., pointed to the result in the Boyd
case (335 U. S., at pp. 67-68): An importer,
although required to present the original invoice to the collector in order to clear goods
for entry, was held privileged from producing
it in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding. The
apparent conflict between the result and the
language in the Boyd case may have resulted
from the double meaning of the word "required." The Invoice was "required" only as
part of an application for governmental per-

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of
the precedents may be questioned, but
there is no quarrel with his conclusions.
self limited this dictum by invoking precedents which involved not merely "required"
or "quasi-public" records but truly public
records, that is, those kept by public officers in the discharge of their public duties.'
But, with deference, it is submitted that
those precedents do not support the asserted limitation on the scope of the Wilson
dictum. This will be clear from an examination of State v. Donovan," one of the cases
cited by Mr. Justice Hughes. In that case,
the privilege was held inapplicable to a
register of sales of intoxicating liquor kept
by a druggist pursuant to a statute providing that such records "shall be open
for the inspection of the public at all reasonable times during business hours and any
person so desiring may make memoranda
or copies thereof."" The court stated that
the registers "are not private documents,
but are public documents, which the defendant was required to keep not for his
private use but for the benefit of the public."" Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that
"the state court construed the statute to
make the druggist a public officer and, as.
such, the custodian of the register for the
state."" This analysis is reminiscent of a
New Mexico case where the state court,
in sustaining the validity of a statute which
required the preservation for inspection of
a bovine animal's hide after it was killed,
stated that the legislature had made the
hide a public record.
But surely this fictional transformation of a druggist (or a
slaughterer) into an ad hoc public officer
scarcely obscures the fact that the druggist

mission to carry out a transaction. It was not

"required" in the sense that a failure to record
an executed transaction would be subject to,
penal sanctions. And it is such records which
typically constitute required records for thepurpose of applying the self-incrimination!
clause. Indeed, the Boyd dictum seems to reflect this distinction.
10Jackson, J., Murphy, J., and Rutledge, J.
also dissented. Rutledge, J.,rested his dissent
on his interpretation of the applicable immunityprovision and merely expressed doubts as t&>
the applicability of the privilege.
" 335 U. S., at pp. 53 and following.
"2335 U. S., at pp. 58 and following.
310 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709 (1901).
14North Dakota Revised Code Sec. 7596 (1899)1510 N. D., at pp. 208-209, 86 N. W., at p. 7116335 U. S., at p. 60.
"7State v. Walker, 34 N. M. 405, 408, 281 Pac..
481, 482 (1929).
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was an ad hoc official only because he was
required to keep the records. The same verbal
ceremony could have been used in the
Shapiro case or in any case involving the
requirement that "private" business keep
records. Moreover, in other cases cited in
the Wilson opinion, also involving liquor regulation, "sthere was either no attempt to characterize the records as "public" " or that
characterization was merely a metaphor describing the unprivileged character of records which were held to be "public" only
because they were required."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of
the Wilson case is unusual. That case has
uniformly been read by commentators ' as
withdrawing the privilege from records
which private citizens are by law required
to keep. Lower federal courts, relying on
the Wilson dictum, have, moreover, almost
uniformly held that records required under
a variety of regulatory statutes are unprivileged.2 And the Supreme Court itself,
prior to the Shapiro case, had apparently
adopted a similar interpretation of the
2 Many of the state cases involved regulation

of medical prescriptions as an incident of general prohibition statutes. See "Quasi Public
Records and Self-Incrimination," 47 Columbia
Law Review 838, 840 (1947). This fact may be
a partial explanation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's implication that governmental access to
required records would be constitutional as to
"occupations which are malum in se, or so
closely allied thereto as to endanger the public
health, morals or safety." (335 U. S., at p. 65.)
But this rationale will surely not explain cases
such as those generally denying the privilege

to motorists required to make reports which

(See Mamet, "Constimay be incriminating.
tutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to
Determine Alcoholic Intoxication," 36 Journal
of Criiminal Law and Criminology 132, 142 and
Moreover, if the privilege
following (1945).)

is grounded in a wise social policy, it is not
entirely clear that the constitutional protection
should be narrowed in the malum-in-se area

even assuming that area could easily be fenced
off. For the community's greater need for
information in that area may well be offset
by the citizens' greater need for protection.
19People v. Henwood, 123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W.
The requirement that druggists
70 (1900).
report to prosecuting attorney liquor sales, including illegal sales, was held valid as a "police
regulation."
20 State v.
Davis, 108 Mo. 666, 671, 18 S. W.
894, 895 (1892). For a more extended discussion

of the justifications urged by state courts in
excluding required records or reports from the

privilege against self-incrimination and a collection of cases, see "Quasi Public Records and
Self-Incrimination," cited at footnote 18, at
pp. 840-843.
21 See.
for example, 8 Wigmore, Evidence,
Sec. 2259c (3d Ed., 1940); "Quasi Public Records
and Self-Incrimination," cited at footnote 18,
at p. 841 (1947); Davis. "The Administrative

Power of Investigation,"
1111,

1137,

Incrimination

footnote

133

56 Yale Law Journal
(1947):

"The

Self-

Privilege in Actions Involving

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

3

Wilson doctrine, although it had not previously applied it squarely.
Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of the precedents is questionable,
there can be no quarrel with his conclusion
that the required-records doctrine, where
it operates, abrogates the privilege. The
consequence of the doctrine is that Congress
by passing a statute requiring the keeping
of records may, subject to elastic limitations," withdraw a constitutional privilege
from those records. This is a bizarre result in a constitutional system. The technical rationale for this inroad on the Fifth
Amendment has been an ill-defined notion
of waiver, that is, a person who carried on
activities subject to record-keeping requirements waives the privilege as to those records.'
But since the "waiver" is said to
result from the statutory requirement, the
waiver rationale is generally no more than
a statement that books required to be kept
are not privileged because they are required
to be kept."
Government Regulated Enterprises," 37 Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology 524 (1947).
U. S., 138 F.
22 See, for example, Rodgers v.
(2d) 992, 995-996 (CCA-6, 1943) (records and
reports required by the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938): U. S. v. Sherry, 294 F. 684 (DC
Ill., 1923) (records under Harrison Act; although
the Wilson doctrine was Invoked, the court
found also that defendant had failed to object
to inspection and removal of the required
records); U. S. v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (DC
Miss., 1947) (records under the Fair Labor
Standards Act). But cf. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corporation, 71 F. (2d) 1, 8 (CCA-5, 1934).
Early cases sustaining the disclosure provisions
of the Emergency Price Control Act emphasized the emergency character of the act. But
later cases relied squarely on the Wilson doctrine. See, for example, Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.
(2d) 362, 367 (CCA-9, 1946), cert. den. 329 U. S.
729 (1946); Porter v. Mueller, 156 F. (2d) 278,
281 (CCA-3, 1946).
'3 See Davis v.
U. S., cited at footnote 8, at
pp. 589 and following, where the Wilson dictum
is quoted with approval:
set out at page see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent (at
pp. 595-596), and his dissent in Harris v. U. S.,
331 U. S. 145, 156 (1947); cf. Gouled v. U. S.,
255 U. S. 298, 308-309 (1921).
2 See footnote 28.
15 "The fundamental ground of decision in this
class of cases, is that where, by virtue of their
character and of the rules of law applicable to
them, the books and papers are held subject
to examination by the demanding authority,
the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend to criminate
him. In assuming their custody he has accepted
the incident obligation to permit inspection."
(Italics supplied.)
Wilson v. U. S., cited at
footnote 7, at pp. 381-382.
dissenting in Shapiro
26 See Frankfurter, J.,
v. U. S., cited at footnote 2, at p. 51. For a
discussion of the explanation of the requiredrecords doctrine suggested by Wigmore and

Despite the implications of the waiver
rationale, the court in the Shapiro case
recognized that there were limitations on
legislative power to abrogate the privilege
by the imposition of record-keeping requirements. It did not, however, indicate clearly
what these limitations are. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, for the Court, declared:
"It may be assumed at the outset that
there are limits which the Government cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the
keeping of records which may be inspected
by an administrative agency and may be
used in prosecuting statutory violations
committed -by the record-keeper himself.
But no serious misgiving that those bounds
have been overstepped would appear to be
evoked when there is a sufficient relation
between the activity sought to be regulated
and the public concern so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid
the basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection by the
Administrator. 27
The foregoing standard makes it easy to
pose difficult cases. Suppose, for example,
the federal government in order to enforce
the Mann Act required the keeping of records of all interstate excursions involving
woman.' Would that requirement be valid?
One can fit the statute under the standard
announced by the Chief Justice in the
Shapiro case, but it obviously has a different
flavor from statutes requiring records as
an incident of a comprehensive regulatory
program.
It is not easy, however, to say precisely
what the difference is. Perhaps it is that
the sole or the dominant purpose of the
hypothetical record requirement appears to
be to compel criminals to keep incriminating records to be used to convict the recordkeepers
in subsequent criminal trials.
Where this appears to be the dominant
purpose, a compelling argument may be

made that the statutory requirement would
appear to be invalid under the Fifth Amendment or, at least, ineffective to destroy the
privilege. The OPA requirements could be
said to have had an independent purpose:
facilitating the determination or modification of price ceilings by preserving relevant
data."
There are obvious difficulties with a test
which stresses an independent purpose. It
is almost always possible to suggest some
independent purpose, for example, the need
for data bearing on the question of whether
more investigators or new laws are needed.
Furthermore, the existence of a proper purpose for record keeping would not necessarily justify the use of the records for an
improper purpose-self-incrimination.
Finally, the criterion laid down by the Court
does not specifically exclude records whose
"sole" purpose is to furnish a diary of crime
to the prosecution.
Although it is arguable that under the
Court's language, a record-keeping requirement "reasonably" related to the enforcement of a valid substantive regulation will
itself be valid, the Court's language is so
elastic as to suggest that a different test
may evolve. Under this test, the governmental need for records to enforce a particular policy, the existence of a purpose
other than compelling documentary confessions and the extent of the encroachment
on the citizen's privacy may all be weighed.
In applying the test, less weight may be
given to "business privacy" as opposed to
"personal privacy," " however difficult it
may be to draw that distinction.

(Footnote 26 continued)
Professor Morgan. -9 M3ltzer, article cited at
footnote 1, at pp. 712-714.
21335
U. S., at p. 32.
28The purpose of the hypothetical statute is
not obscured by the fact that some of the recorded transactions would be innocent. Innocent transactions can always be brought under
the record-keeping requirements by draftsmanship which makes the category of transactions
to be recorded broad enough to include both
legal and illegal transactions.
29 See Shapiro v. U. S., cited at footnote 2,
at pp. 8 and following.
8 This preference for "personal privacy" is
suggested (1) by the cases which have withdrawn the privilege from the books of corporations and unincorporated associations (see

footnote 1) and (2) by the cases narrowing the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures where searches
involved business premises. See, for example

Required Income Tax Records
It is surprising that the applicability of
the required-records doctrine to the recordkeeping and disclosure requirements under
the income tax laws has not been clearly
settled.' Comments written after the Shapiro

U. S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950).

a Sec. 3614 of the Internal Revenue Code
authorizes the Commissioner or his delegees,
for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return or for the purpose of making a
return where none is filed, to examine relevant
books and records, and to require the attendance and testimony of knowledgeable persons.
Sec. 3615 authorizes the collector In a variety
of specified situations to summon persons and
to require them to produce books and records
and to give testimony under oath, at a specified
time and place. Failure to appear and testify
or to appear and produce books in compliance
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case have suggested that the privileged character of taxpayers' records is not affected
If by that it is meant
by that decision."
that a taxpayer may, on the ground that he
would be incriminated thereby, withhold
required records sought by the revenue
authorities in order to fix tax liability, the
conclusion is open to serious doubt.
It is true that several lower federal court
cases ' indicate that the taxpayer may withhold required records from revenue agents
seeking to determine the amount of his tax
liability. But these cases, which do not even
discuss the required-records doctrine, are of
doubtful authority for two reasons: (1) the
implications of U. S. v. Sullivan,4 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1927; (2) although
a formal distinction between regulatory and
revenue records may be made, that distinction is insubstantial in the light of the purposes underlying the required-records doctrine.
In U. S. v. Sullivan, the defendant, indicted for failing to file an income tax return, defended on the ground that he was
privileged to withhold it because it would
have disclosed his illegal bootlegging activities. The Supreme Court, reversing the
Fourth Circuit Court, which had sustained
that defense, held that the privilege did not
justify the failure to make any return; the
proper course for the defendant would have
been to file a "return" and to claim his
(Footnote 31 continued)
with a summons issued by a collector under
Sec. 3615 is expressly made a crime, punishable
by fine and Imprisonment (See. 3616). On the
other hand, the Code does not specifically provide that noncompliance with a demand or summons under See. 3614 is punishable.
The
Supreme Court has, however, held that an individual who is summoned under Sec. 3614 and
refuses to answer a proper question is subject
to See. 145 (a) of the Code, which makes the
willful failure to supply any Information or to
keep any records required by the Commissioner
a crime punishable by fine and Imprisonment.
(U. S. v. Murdock, 2 us-rc ff 828, 284 U. S. 141
(1931).) The Regulations require taxpayers to
keep the books and records necessary for the
determination of their tax liability. (Regs. 111,
Sec. 29.54-1 (1949).)
For a detailed discussion
of the foregoing provisions see Barnes, "Inquisitorial Powers of the Federal Government Relating to Taxes," 28 TAXES 1211 (December,
1950).
2 Kamens and Ancier, "Immunity from Subpoena of Taxpayers' Records," 27 TAXES 639,
642-643 (July, 1949).
3 See, for example, Internal Revenue Agent
v. Sullivan, 287 F. 138, 140, 143 (DC N. Y.,
1923).
(Taxpayer previously indicted for conspiracy to defraud held privileged to withhold
books from revenue agent. The pendency of
the fraud indictment may have created the
suspicion that the "tax" examination was designed to circumvent the privilege in an independent criminal proceeding.) See also Manton,
J., concurring In Steinberg v. U. S., 14 F. (2d)
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

privilege with reference to answers which
he considered protected. Although not directly passing on the proper disposition of
such a claim, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, suggested that it
might be rejected.'
His cautionary language, when read in the light of the government's contention in the Sullivan case that
a tax return was a public record within
the meaning of the Wilson dictum,' casts
doubt on the applicability of the privilege
to income tax returns-doubts which are
equally applicable to required tax records.
If the questions left open by the Sullivan
case are resolved in the light of the purposes underlying the required-records doctrine, it seems likely that tax records will
be given no more protection than records
required by the OPA. It is true that the
Court in the Shapiro case spoke in terms of
records required for regulatory purposes and
that this language could be seized upon as
a basis for distinguishing tax records and
excluding them from the operation of the
required-records doctrine. This distinction,
however, lacks substance. There appears to
be no reason for holding that the Constitution imposes greater restraints on disclosure
when the revenue power rather than the
regulatory power is involved. Revenue, the
backbone of enforcement, goes to the heart
of effective regulation. After having removed the privilege from records required
564, 568 (CCA-2, 1926); Nicola v. U. S., 72 F.
(2d) 780. 784 (CCA-3, 1934).
84 274 U. S. 259 (1927).
"It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to
say that it authorized a man to refuse to state
the amount of his income because it had been
made in crime."
(274 U. S., at pp. 263-264.)
This quoted statement is ambiguous. It may
mean that the connection between a statement
of the amount of one's income and a crime is
not close enough for the statement to be privileged; or it may mean that income tax reports,
as such, are not privileged. The former interpretation is supported by Holmes' citation of
Mason v. U. S., 244 U. S. 362 (1917), where the
Court in effect required a "direct" connection
between the anticipated answer and criminality
before recognizing a claim of privilege.
Although the Sullivan opinion dealt with
required reports to the government rather than
required records open to Inspection, no distinction has been drawn between the privileged
status of these two informatory devices. See
Rodgers v. U. S., 43-2 vsTc 5I9664, 138 F. (2d)
992 (CCA-6, 1943); 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec.
2259c (3d Ed., 1940); Handler, "Constitutionality
of Investigation by Federal Trade Commission:
II," 28 Columbia Law Review 905, 917 (1928).
For a collection of early federal cases and
state cases dealing with the privileged status of
taxpayers' records, see Gange Lumber Company
v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 180, 53 Pac. (2d) 743
(1936), annotated in 103 A. L. R. 513 (1936).
36274 U. S., at pp. 260-261.

as an incident of a regulatory program in
order to facilitate enforcement, it would be
paradoxical for the Court to stop short
where revenue records are involved. And
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the
Shapiro case indicates that he would not
add this paradox to the law of the privilege."
Finally, if the independent purpose test
mentioned above is recognized, consideration of the purposes behind the recordkeeping requirements also leads to the
conclusion that required tax records are
unprivileged. Such records are obvious and
indispensable aids in the determination of
the amount of tax liability. Accordingly,
it can scarcely be argued that the sole or
dominating purpose of the requirements is
to force the taxpayer to keep a diary of
his own criminality for use in a prosecution
against him.
Complications are introduced when rec,ords required by statute for the purpose
of determining tax liability are allegedly
being examined for other purposes. Such
complications will, of course, arise whenever Agency A is charged with using its
informatory powers for Agency B, and the
ensuing discussion, although dealing largely
with tax records, will also illustrate the
general range of problems involved when,ever records are sought for purposes other
than these which produced the record-keeping requirement.
Where an examination is being conducted
by revenue authorities ostensibly for revenue purposes, it is doubtful that courts will
*undertake to determine whether the examination is in actuality prompted by some
.other purpose, for example, the preparation
of a criminal case against the taxpayer.
Such an inquiry raises so many practical
difficulties that it is likely that the "power"
-of the revenue agent rather than his "motive" will be decisive."
Where an agency not authorized by stat-ure to inspect the required records seeks
to subpoena or examine them, a different
.question is raised: whether records required
under a particular statute are unprivileged
.only in the proceedings contemplated by
the particular statute or whether the re.quired records are unprivileged generally.
Could the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, in an investigation of
1,335 U. S., at pp. 53-54.
3 Cf. In re International Corporation, 4 usTre
111225, 5 F. Supp. 608, 611 (DC N. Y., 1934).
A different result might perhaps be reached
-when, as in Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan,
.cited at footnote 33, the taxpayer has been
indicted prior to inspection of his books.
39335 U. S., at p. 54.
Simi'o T. D. 4929. 1939-2 CB 91, Sec. 463C.33.
lar regulations provide access to returns by

market manipulation, compel the production
of incriminating records which are required
to be kept only under the revenue statutes?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion in the Shapiro case read the majority opinion as rendering records required
for one purpose unprivileged for all pur9
This result might follow from a
poses.
mechanical application of the "public document" metaphor. But there are persuasive
reasons for rejecting it: Congress by requiring the keeping of records to achieve
a particular purpose has indicated only that
privacy, or more bluntly, the privilege,
should yield to that purpose. It does not
follow that the privilege should yield to
other regulatory purposes.
Related problems arise where the revenue
authorities examine records for revenue purposes and discover criminal violations of the
tax laws or other laws and furnish copies
or summaries of the resultant information
to the Department of Justice or to any other
interested agency. Discussion of these
problems will be facilitated by distinguishing between information contained in income tax returns and information contained
in records of examination of books and
papers or of witnesses.
Current Treasury Regulations ' based on
Section 55(a) of the Code endow the Secretary of the Treasury with discretion to
grant the request of other federal agencies
to inspect income tax returns. These regulations, moreover, explicitly provide for the
use of the resultant information as evidence
in any proceeding before a federal agency
or in any proceeding to which the United
States is a party." Finally, the regulations
provide that income tax returns may be
furnished to a United States attorney or
the Department of Justice for use in grand
in
jury proceedings or in court litigation
4
which the United States is interested. 2
Where the information requested by, or
furnished to, another agency is derived by
internal revenue agents from the taxpayer's
books and records, as distinguished from
his return, different problems of statutory
authority and of policy are involved. The
Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly
regulate the furnishing of such information
to other agencies or their inspection of such
state officers and by shareholders (T. D. 4945,
1939-2 CB 97, Sees. 463D.1-463D.3). Code Sec.
55 (d) (1) authorizes inspection by committees
of Congress.
41 T. D. 4945, 1939-2 CB 97, Sec. 463D.1.

The

Regulations do not deal with the admissibility
of returns in state proceedings.
42-T. D. 4945, 1939-2 CB 97, See. 463D.4.
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The cases, although not clear, appear to
sanction the interchange of information
by government agencies.

information.
Accordingly, the controlling
statute would appear to be Section 22 of
Title 5 of the United States Code, which
provides as follows:
"The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks,
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property
appertaining to it." (Italics supplied.)
Section 22 is sufficient statutory authority
for the Treasury Regulations which authorize the inspection of official records containing material obtained from the taxpayer's
books and records.4
Under the foregoing regulations, it is
obvious that returns filed, and books kept,
to aid in the determination of tax liability
may become the instrument of the taxpayer's incrimination not merely under the tax
laws but under any federal criminal statute.
The attempted use of the information in
such criminal proceeding might be met with
the argument that the taxpayer's privilege
is being circumvented: Another federal
agency (B) is securing from the collector's
office (A) information which B could not
secure directly because of lack of statutory
authority or because the books, if incriminating, would be privileged. Where the
collector's office (A) has obtained information from the taxpayer's books, it could
also be argued that permitting use of that
information by another agency (B) would
encourage B to induce A to act as its investigatory arm. Accordingly, the regulations permitting such use would
be
inconsistent with the limitations on both
A's and B's authority to investigate and
would be "inconsistent with law" as that
term is used in Section 22 of Title 5.
41 Regs. 111, Sec. 29.55(b)-1, Sec. 1.2.
A general federal statute prohibits unauthorized
disclosure of information obtained by a federal
officer in the course of his employment (18
USCA See. 1905, 62 Stat. 791 (1948)). See also
Code Sec. 4047 (a) (1).
Sec. 55 (f) of the
Internal Revenue Code contains a similar prohibition applicable to returns.
Disclosures
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury
pursuant to Sec. 22 of Title 5 would avoid these
prohibitions.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

The argument based on the construction
of Section 22 will not survive analysis.
That argument requires an assumption that
what is ostensibly a tax investigation is
prompted by other motives. Absent any
evidence that the revenue authorities were
acting on behalf of another agency, the
presumption of official regularity would
operate to require the acceptance of a tax
investigation at face value.
Moreover,
where a possible revenue motivation for the
investigation is present, it is probable that
the courts would give short shrift to a contention that hidden motives to aid another
agency prompted an ostensible revenue investigation."
The collector's investigation
would thus be valid regardless of the multiple use of the resultant information, except
in the unusual situation where there was
proof that he was acting solely as the arm
of another agency. And since there is no
law against interchange of information, regulations by the Secretary of the Treasury
authorizing other agencies to use the resultant information would not be "inconsistent with law" and would be justified by
Section 5 of Title 22.
The argument based on the privilege is
no more persuasive. The complying taxpayer has furnished information unprivileged at the time of its acquisition. He
is not subjected to testimonial compulsion,
or indeed to any further compulsion, when
another agency uses this information, and
the taxpayer cannot, therefore, invoke the
privilege.
Congress, moreover, could in
many situations have constitutionally required the direct submission of reports to,
and the keeping of records for, the other
federal agency. There is no apparent reason why Congress cannot properly authorize
federal agencies to do indirectly (through
the collector's office) what they could be
authorized to do directly (through their
own original investigations). Indeed, such
measures are desirable because they avoid
harassment of the honest citizen and useless
expenditure by the government.
The cases, although not entirely clear,
appear to sanction interchange of information by government agencies."
It is not
41Cf. In re InternationalCorporation, cited at
footnote 38. A different result might perhaps
be reached when, as in Internal Revenue Agent
v. Sullivan, cited at footnote 33, the taxpayer
had been indicted prior to inspection of his
books.
45See Zap v. U. S., 328 U. S. 624, 629 (1945):
"Neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment
would preclude the agents from testifying at
the trial concerning the facts about which they

likely that these cases would be repudiated
by the Supreme Court. The Court has
sanctioned dramatically direct inroads on
the privilege, through the required-records
doctrine and otherwise."
It is unlikely

that it would now strike down the shadowy
and oblique limitation involved in the sensible exchange of information by government
agencies.
[The End]

WHY PRICES ARE HIGH
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inflation. The politicians in Washington talk
of it as if it were some horrible visitation
from without, over which they had no control-like a flood, a foreign invasion or a
plague. It is something they are always
promising to "fight"-if Congress or the
people will only give them the "weapons"
or "a strong law" to do the job.
Yet the plain truth is that our political
leaders have brought on inflation by their
own money and fiscal policies. They are
promising to fight with their right hand the
conditions they have brought on with their left.
Inflation, always and everywhere, is primarily caused by an increase in the supply
of money and credit. In fact, inflation is
the increase in the supply of money and
credit. If you turn to the recent American
College Dictionary, for example, you will
find the first definition of inflation given as
follows: "Undue expansion or increase of
the currency of a country, especially by the
issuing of paper money not redeemable in
specie."
The word "inflation" originally applied
solely to the quantity of money. It meant
that the volume of money was inflated,
blown up, overextended.
It is not mere
pedantry to insist that the word should be
used only in its original meaning. To use
it to mean "a rise in prices" is to deflect
attention away from the real cause of inflation and the real cure for it.
Let us see what happens under inflation,
and why it happens. When the supply of
money is increased, people have more money
to offer for goods. If the supply of goods
does not increase-or does not increase as
much as the supply of money-then the
prices of goods will go up. Each individual
dollar becomes less valuable because there
are more dollars. Therefore, more of them
(Footnote 45 continued)
had lawfully obtained knowledge."
See also
Gouled v. U. S., cited at footnote 23, at pp.
311-312; Harris v. U. S., cited at footnote 23,
at p. 154; U. S. v. Monjar, 147 F. (2d) 916, 924
(CCA-3, 1944); Shinyu Noro v. U. S., 148 F. (2d)
696 (CCA-5, 1945). But cf. Shushan v. U. S., 117
F. (2d) 110, 117-118 (CCA-5. 1941); U. S. v.

will be offered against, say, a pair of shoes
or a hundred bushels of wheat than before.
A "price" is an exchange ratio between a
dollar and a unit of goods. When people
have more dollars, they value each dollar
less. Goods then rise in price, not because
goods are scarcer than before but because
dollars are more abundant.
In the old days, governments inflated by
clipping and debasing the coinage. Then
they found they could inflate cheaper and
faster simply by grinding out paper money
on a printing press. This is what happened
with the French assignats in 1789, and with
our own currency during the Revolutionary War. Today the method is a little
more indirect. Our government sells its
bonds or other IOU's to the banks. In
payment, the banks create "deposits" on
their books against which the government
can draw. A bank in turn may sell its
government IOU's to the Federal Reserve
Bank, which pays for them either by creating a deposit credit or having more Federal
Reserve notes printed and paying them out.
This is how money is manufactured.
The greater part of the "money supply"
of this country is represented not by hand-tohand currency but by bank deposits which
are drawn against by checks. Hence, when
most economists measure our money supply
they add demand deposits (and now usually,
also, time deposits) to currency outside of
banks to get the total. The total of money
and credit so measured was $64,099,000,000
at the end of December,
1939, and
$174,200,000,000 at the end of June this
year. This increase of 171 per cent in the
supply of money is overwhelmingly the
main reason why wholesale prices rose 135
per cent from 1939 to June of this year.Henry Hazlitt, Newsweek, September 3, 1951
(Foundation for Economic Education Clipping of Note No. 42).
Cooper, 288 F. 604 (DC Iowa, 1923), rev'd on
other grounds, 9 F. (2d) 216 (CCA-8, 1925).
(Noncorporate books and papers obtained by
revenue agents and turned over to Department
of Justice for use In grand Jury proceedings
suppressed.)
"See Meltzer article cited at footnote 1, at
p. 688, footnote 11.
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